DRT’s treatment of inference and presupposition as a source of semantic enrichment by Salguero Lamillar, Francisco J.
279
DRT’s treatment of inference and presupposition as
a source of semantic enrichment
Francisco J. Salguero Lamillar
Universidad de Sevilla
salguero@cica.es
1 Inferential semantic enrichment in discourse interpretation
The Discourse Representation Theory (DRT) (Kamp & Reyle 1993) provides an expla-
nation of the semantic enrichment processes that are present in discourse, by means of the
structure of the successive representations associated to a concrete sequence of utterances.
In the case of pronominal anaphora or indefinites, interpretation is just possible in relation
with those elements present in discourse or in associated databases. Each Discourse Repre-
sentation Structure (DRS) can be seen as a database within which certain information about
the world is codified. So, when the speaker codifies a message, we can think on a selection
of lexical elements suitable for representing the referred individuals and the properties they
have, the relations they hold in a concrete description of the world and even the properties
and relations between this description of the world and other ones. All these elements are
combined using certain rules; so the hearer obtains from the speaker a series of linguistic
data to which he must apply his grammatical, logical and encyclopaedic knowledge in order
to be able of decodifying the complete information. In a very general way, the following
scheme could be an illustration of discourse interpretation process:
Rules of grammar Rules of logic Knowledge of the
world
Discourse interpretation
Figure 1
Grammar, logic and encyclopaedic knowledge appear in this scheme as separate mod-
ules with a unique and final relation: the interpretation of the speaker utterances. Neverthe-
less, there are enough reasons to think that the established relations among these modules
are closer. Without discussing questions about syntactic or morphological iconicity and
those logical aspects that are more evident in natural language grammar, we can consider
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that the interpretation of any linguistic utterance rests on the application of all these knowl-
edge modules to the intermediate representations of discourse that are necessary for evalu-
ating the speaker utterances. Consider the scheme in Figure 2, more complex than the for-
mer one:
Rules of Grammar
(Linguistic Knowledge)
Rules of Logic
Meaning postulates
Rules of lexical information
Situation &
Context
(Knowledge
of the world)
Anaphoric variable instantiation
rules
Discourse
(Previous information)
Utterance Interpretation
Figure 2
As it can be seen, the instantiation of anaphoric variables is considered as an intermedi-
ate module for the interpretation of utterances. Therefore, the interpretation of anaphora
(pronouns, indefinite noun phrases, definite descriptions, relative clauses, spatial or tempo-
ral deictic terms, tense and aspect of verbs, etc.) is the common element for the confluence
of the other modules. Hence the importance of anaphoric inference in DRT and another
dynamic frames of discourse interpretation.
In the interpretation of discourse, it is rare to have a unique database for establishing its
global meaning. Several related databases are usually needed to obtain a model. The given
relations among representations or necessary databases for the evaluation of discourse ut-
terances are far away from those in classical model theory. Conceived in this manner as
linguistic databases, the different representations of discourse are similar to possible
worlds. So they can be seen as moments, giving a temporal interpretation to discourse rep-
resentations; or they can be seen as successive states of the speaker/hearer’s mind, and then
we have that discourse representations are similar to Kripke’s information states. Whatever
the case could be, the representations of discourse are interpreted as partial models of real-
ity, and therefore they can be treated as Hintikka sets (Salguero 1994).
This perspective allows us dealing with discourse interpretation as a sort of logical cal-
culus, a series of inferences on the successive representations of discourse that take the
281
hearer to the meaning of its constituent utterances. Such inferences depend on the rules of
the grammatical and logical modules, and on the hearer’s knowledge of the world. But
there is even another decisive factor that intervenes in these inferences: presuppositions.
2 Presuppositions and DRT
The notion of presupposition has been discussed since Antiquity, without having
reached a consensus about its linguistic or logical nature up to the day. We can see it as a
semantic relation between sentences and define it saying that a sentence B presupposes
another sentence A if A implies B or if the truth value of A is a condition for the truth value
of B. It is also usual to understand the notion of presupposition pragmatically as a set of
attitudes and notices, being used by language users in their speech acts. In this case, we
refer to speaker/hearer’s presuppositions instead of sentence presuppositions. But there is
no opposition between these two perspectives because we can treat presupposition as a one
more part of the interpretation of the utterances that constitute discourse in a concrete rep-
resentation of its meaning, and then both perspectives are satisfied: the semantic and the
pragmatic one.
This signifies that we will not find a well defined notion of presupposition in the spe-
cialised literature, but a set of linguistic data that must be explained in a theory about dis-
course interpretation (Levinson 1983). Typical examples of these linguistic data are sen-
tences like:
(1) Have you stopped hitting your wife?
(2) The actual king of France is not bald
In (1) we have that the verbal aspect and the possessive your presuppose that the hearer
has a wife and that he hits her. In (2) we are in front of a classical existence presupposition
introduced by the definite determiner the. Both sentences are classical examples of presup-
positions, but they are not the only ones. We can classify the linguistic elements that can be
the source of presuppositions in discourse, following (Beaver 1997):
1. Definite noun phrases, introduced by the definite article, demonstratives or posses-
sives, proper names or even relative clauses.
2. Quantified noun phrases, introduced by a quantificational determiner.
3. Factive verbs or verbal nouns and noun phrases related to them, such as reject,
know, the fact that, the acquaintance of, etc. In this case we can distinguish be-
tween cognitive factives, related to the knowledge of the facts, and emotive fac-
tives, related to emotional attitudes towards the facts.
4. Clefts (it-, wh- or pseudo-clefts), like It was not John who called you up, presup-
posing someone called you up.
5. Wh-questions that presuppose the existence of an entity suitable for an answer, like
What colour is the snark?, presupposing the existence of a “snark”.
6. Counterfactuals, presupposing the falsity of the antecedent.
7. Lexical presuppositions. For instance, dog presupposes animal.
8. Action verbs, like stop doing something, aspectual or temporal modifiers, like be-
fore or after in certain sentences (v. gr.: After having your breakfast, go out to
school, presupposing you are having breakfast).
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9. Iterative expressions, like again, or the prefix re-, presupposing some kind of repe-
tition.
10. Some discourse connectives, like although, but, because.
Casuistry is wide and we do not pretend to have a list with every source of presupposi-
tion in discourse. But we can see now that presuppositions in the sentences (1) and (2)
depend on verbal aspect and tense, studied, for instance, in (Kamp & Reyle 1993:483f.),
and on the interpretation of noun phrases and the quantificational scope of the determiners.
This last one is the most usual source of existential presupposition in discourse and we will
analyse it in this paper.
2.1 Accommodation of presuppositions in DRSs
It is evident, as we have mentioned before, that presuppositions play an important role
in discourse interpretation. They are indeed a part in the semantic and logical structure of
the discourse utterances and, therefore, they must appear in any representation of that
structure. So we need a method for making presuppositions explicit in Discourse Repre-
sentation Structures (DRSs), since they are the way in which DRT represents discourse
interpretation. We are adopting van der Sandt’s method, consisting in the explicit extension
of discourse context in order to include in the correspondent DRS all the presuppositions
intervening in the interpretation of the utterances (van der Sandt 1992, 1993). This method
is called accommodation.
Accommodation consists in the addition of discourse referents and conditions to a DRS.
This addition is made in any of the accessible representations that contain the discourse
element that triggers the presupposition. When a trigger element causes a presupposition
without an antecedent, accommodation will consist in the transference of discourse markers
and conditions of the presupposition from the representation of the trigger to an accessible
DRS. Therefore, we can distinguish among local accommodation (when the addition is
made in the same DRS of the trigger), global accommodation (when the addition is made in
the main DRS that includes all the other representations), and intermediate accommodation
(when the addition is made in another DRS, different from the main one and accessible
from the DRS where the trigger element appears) (van der Sandt 1992).
Triggers are seen as anaphoric elements in discourse interpretation because these ele-
ments cannot be interpreted with independence of the structural relation established be-
tween the position in which they are represented in a DRS and the place where the repre-
sentations of their antecedents are: an accessible DRS, like in the case of pronominal
anaphora’s antecedents. Let us see an example taken from (Beaver 1997):
(3) Mary doesn’t realise that somebody is escaping.
The correspondent DRS (DRS1) includes the presupposition somebody is escaping, that
will be represented within a double line box. This presupposition marks the existence in the
discourse universe of an individual z and verifies the condition is_escaping(z). The marker
w can be instantiated as z because the presupposition is accessible from its DRS. We can
compare (DRS1) with the interpretation of the sentence (4), represented by (DRS2):
(4) Fred is escaping but Mary doesn’t realise somebody is escaping.
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(DRS1)
y
Mary(y)
z
is_escaping(z)
 
w
realises(y, is_escaping(w) )
(DRS2)
x,y
Fred(x)
is_escaping(x)
Mary(y)
z
is_escaping(z)
 
w
realises(y, is_escaping(w) )
The main DRS in (DRS2) is accessible from the negated DRS, so the marker z can be
instantiated by means of the marker x. Therefore, the universe of the presupposition can be
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reached from the global universe of discourse, as the condition of the presupposition is
accessible like a global condition. This means that the presupposition has an antecedent
and, therefore, as it does not play another role in (DRS2), it could be eliminated salva in-
terpretatione. When we eliminate a presupposition by means of its resolution into an ante-
cedent as in (DRS2), or when we accommodate it into a DRS accessible from the trigger’s
representation, we say that the presupposition is cancelled. But, how does the accommoda-
tion method work in relation with the presuppositions in a DRS? Consider the following
sentence:
(5) If Mary chose the Sherry then she realises it is a good wine.
In the following DRSs, we will simplify the discourse markers using individual con-
stants m and s, denoting Mary and Sherry respectively, and the bidimensional structure will
be represented linearly for saving space in the page. Then, in (DRS3) the signs [ and ] are
single line box limits and the signs { and } are double line box limits. An empty box [  ]
means that there is no individual marker for that representation.
(DRS3) [ [m,s] [ [  ] chose(m,s)]   [ [  ] { [  ] good_wine(s) } realises(m, [ [  ]
good_wine(s) ] ) ] ]
In order to have a DRS where no presupposition appears without an antecedent, we
must move the DRS representing the presupposition towards any of the sites that are acces-
sible from the trigger’s DRS, that is to say: from the representation of the sentence Mary
realises that the Sherry is a good wine. This movement produces three different DRSs
depending on the accommodation type:
Global accommodation: The Sherry is a good wine and if Mary chose it, she realises it is
a good wine.
(DRS4) [ [m,s] good_wine(s) [ [  ] chose(m,s)]   [ [  ] realises(m, [ [  ] good_wine(s) ] ) ] ]
Intermediate accommodation: If the Sherry is a good wine and Mary chose it then she
realises it is a good wine
(DRS5) [ [m,s] [ [  ] good_wine(s) chose(m,s)]   [ [  ] realises(m, [ [  ] good_wine(s) ] ) ] ]
Local accommodation: If Mary chose the Sherry then it is a good wine and she realises it
is a good wine.
(DRS6) [ [m,s] [ [  ] chose(m,s)]   [ [  ] good_wine(s) realises(m, [ [  ] good_wine(s) ] ) ] ]
Each one of these three DRSs supposes a different interpretation of the existing relation
between the sentence (5) and the presupposed sentence The Sherry is a good wine. Now we
can ask what kind of accommodation is the best one for the interpretation of an uterrance
like (5) and try to establish a priority. First, we must try to instantiate the presupposition
markers in the actual accommodation. That is what is called resolution. But resolution is
possible only when we have accessible markers for the instantiation, from the DRS con-
taining the presupposition trigger up to the main DRS. When we cannot find markers for
the resolution then we must appeal to accommodation, but now going in the reverse way:
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from the main DRS up to the trigger’s DRS. This means the priority is resolution and then,
when resolution is not possible, global accommodation, intermediate accommodation and
finally local accommodation. This process has certain constraints that can be found in (van
der Sandt 1992) or in (Beaver 1997).
2.2 Existential presuppositions and DRSs
We can now recover the classical example by Bertrand Russell to illustrate the treat-
ment of existence presuppositions in DRT:
(2) The actual king of France is not bald
The problem for Predicate Logic is whether this sentence is true or false because there is
no entity in the domain of discourse that could be considered as a good instantiation for the
individual variable in order to satisfy the predicate to_be_the_king_of_france. Nevertheless,
Russell said that the logical form of this sentence presupposes the existence of such an
individual:
[2]  x(king_of_france(x)  bald(x))
It is evident that if [2] is true then we can infer [2’], that is to say: There is a king of
France; but if [2] is false then we can infer [2”], that is to say: All the kings of France are
bald.
[2’]  x(king_of_france(x))
[2”]  x(king_of_france(x) bald(x)),
To avoid this kind of undesirable presuppositions, Russell proposed his theory of defi-
nite descriptions, introducing a logical operator   as a descriptor. In this theory, two possi-
ble scopes were postulated for negation: a restricted scope [2*] (corresponding to the global
accommodation of the presupposition) and a general scope [2+] (corresponding to the local
accommodation):
[2*]  x[king_of_france(x)](  bald(x))
[2+]  ( x[king_of_france(x)](bald(x)))
(DRS7) Global accommodation: (DRS8) Local accommodation:
x
king_of_france(x) x
 king_of_france(x)
 bald(x) bald(x)
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In ordinary discourse, to avoid the undesirable effect produced by the existential pre-
supposition in (2), we can enrich our utterance with an explanation in the following way:
(6) The actual king of France is not bald. There is no actual king of France.
The corresponding DRS to (6) must include, however, the existential presupposition and
deal with it in the adequate manner, resolving its discourse markers or accommodating it in
the corresponding site inside the DRS:
(DRS9) [ [  ]  [ [  ] bald(x) { [x] king_of_france(x) } ]  [ [y] king_of_france(y) ] ]
The two possible accommodations for the presupposition in (DRS9), after leaving the
possibility of resolution of the marker x aside, are the following ones:
(DRS10) [ [x] king_of_france(x)  [ [  ] bald(x) ]  [ [y] king_of_france(y) ] ]
(DRS11) [ [  ]  [ [x] bald(x) king_of_france(x) ]  [ [y] king_of_france(y) ] ]
(DRS10) represents the global accommodation of the presupposition and (DRS11) rep-
resents the local accommodation. But, between both options, we must prefer the local ac-
commodation (DRS11), because the global accommodation (DRS10) contains a contradic-
tion since we can resolve the marker y instantiating it in the marker x that appears in an
accessible representation. Then, the existential presupposition is cancelled in (DRS11).
The addition of van der Sandt’s accommodation theory to DRT to deal with presuppo-
sitions gives us certain advantages over other alternative theories. It includes, for instance, a
resolution mechanism for anaphora we cannot find in the theory of definite descriptions.
Moreover, it offers a criterion for distinguishing between different scopes of the presuppo-
sition and choosing the most adequate one in each case to cancel it. It also offers the possi-
bility of treating in a different way the different presuppositions appearing in discourse,
depending on the relations with their trigger elements and their sites inside the global DRS
that represents their meaning.
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